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INTRODUCTION
Pharmaceutical companies have been known to make moves that much of
the general public may find questionable at best, reprehensible at worst. The
infamous case of Martin Shkreli, who earned the title of “most-hated man in
America” after he was accused of serious price gouging on a life-saving
medication, comes to mind.1 Beyond Shkreli, companies that produce opioids,
which have been accused of worsening the opioid epidemic, have been indicted
on criminal charges.2 However, despite this bad press, it has not deterred more
poor decision-making from other pharmaceutical companies.
Most recently,3 Allergan was taken to task after it transferred its patent for
Restasis (an incredibly profitable drug for the company) to the Saint Regis
Mohawk Indian Tribe (Regis Mohawk Tribe) in an attempt to avoid an inter

1. Misyrlena Egkolfopoulou, Patricia Hurtado, and Chris Dolmetsch, Why “Pharma Bro”
Martin Skreli is Swaggering Into Jail, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 4, 2017, 4:01 PM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-08-04/-pharma-bro-fall-why-most-hated-ceo-isswaggering-into-jail [https://perma.cc/RSW7-W3K5].
2. Samantha Raphelson, Alabama Targets OxyContin Maker Purdue Pharma in Opioid Suit,
NPR (Feb. 7, 2018, 4:02 PM), https://www.npr.org/2018/02/07/584034397/alabama-targetsoxycontin-maker-purdue-pharma-in-opioid-suit [https://perma.cc/HK7W-UL2X].
3. Most recently at the time this article was written. The author acknowledges that another
pharmaceutical company may very well take it upon itself to try to one-up Allergan.
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partes review (IPR) by the Patent Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB).4 According
to Allergan’s press release, the Regis Mohawk Tribe would receive $13.75
million upon execution of the agreement and $15 million each year in
royalties.5 In return, the Regis Mohawk Tribe promised to not waive its
sovereign immunity in any forthcoming IPR challenges, and Allergan would
have an exclusive license to continue producing and profiting from Restasis.6
The impact of shielding Restasis from any IPR challenges is two-fold: (1) other
drug companies will have one less option for invalidating the patent, and (2) it
opens up the market for generics.7
Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe made this deal following the
decision by the PTAB in Covidien LP v. University of Florida Research
Foundation (“Covidien”) in early 2017 that held that state entities are protected
from IPR due to their sovereign immunity.8 Presumably, Allergan assumed
that the sovereign immunity rights given to state entities would extend to tribal
sovereign immunity. Allergan’s conclusion that it could contract with a tribe
to essentially purchase its immunity has been questioned by other courts. For
example, in Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc., the court had to
consider whether to join the Regis Mohawk Tribe to a patent infringement suit
between Allergan, the plaintiff, and competitor TEVA, the defendant.9 The
court questioned the validity of Allergan’s arrangement with the Regis
Mohawk Tribe on multiple grounds, including questioning whether there was
a valid contract between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe or if the transfer
was a sham and the contract was void due to lack of valid consideration.10 The
4. Press Release, Allergan, Allergan and Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe Announce Agreements
Regarding RESTASIS® Patents (Sep. 8, 2017) (published on Allergan’s website). The inter partes
review process is a point of contention for drug companies. See Eric Sagonowsky, In a blow for
pharma, Supreme Court upholds the hated IPR patent challenge, FiercePharma (Apr. 24, 2018, 4:35
PM),
https://www.fiercepharma.com/pharma/iprs-hated-by-branded-drugmakers-deemedconstitutional-at-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/FME8-L6QW]. Pharmaceutical companies contend
that the IPR process allows for unnecessary increases in the amount of litigation they have to defend
against. Id. Competing drug companies still have other routes for invalidating the patent in federal
court. Id. However, the IPR process is quicker with a higher success rate. Over fifty percent of patents
challenged before the PTAB are invalidated. Orlando Lopez, Inter Partes Review: After Five Years,
What Will 2018 Bring?, Burns Levinson (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/interpartes-review-after-five-years-92507/ [https://perma.cc/7NXD-K76F].
5. Press Release, Allergan, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Currently, the two main process available are the inter partes review process and actions
available through the Hatch-Waxman Act. See discussion infra Part IV.
8. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Nos. IPR2016-01274, IPR2016-01275,
IPR2016-01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017).
9. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at
*1 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
10. Id. at *3.
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court ultimately did not have to decide this issue, leaving it for the PTAB to
determine at a later date.11
The PTAB recognized the doctrine of tribal immunity but considered a line
of cases that indicated that Congress could impliedly abrogate immunity when
a statute is of general applicability.12 The PTAB concluded that the IPR
proceedings were based on statutes of general applicability, which impliedly
abrogates the Regis Mohawk Tribe’s immunity as a defense in IPR
proceedings.13 On appeal, the Federal Circuit ignored the PTAB’s reasoning
and determined that agency proceedings by the Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO) are akin to actions by the federal government, and no immunity is
allowed as a defense.14
This Comment will address two primary issues. First, it will analyze the
basis of sovereign immunity rights of tribes, with a focus on the relationship
between intellectual property rights and sovereignty. Second, it will discuss
whether this arrangement violates the antitrust laws of the United States. This
Comment concludes that even if a claim of tribal sovereign immunity is
legitimate, it is likely that such an arrangement still violates the relevant
antitrust claims.
I. TRIBAL SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY
The foundation of any tribal sovereignty analysis begins with the
Constitution, which states that Congress shall have the power “[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.”15 Conflict between the tribes and the United States has been
around for longer than the nation has actually been a nation.16 Thus, trying to
navigate the extent of the relationship between our nation and the tribal nations
has been going on for over two hundred years: initially in treaties and later in
congressional acts.17 Congress’ right to regulate the tribes was described in
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock.18 The Court stated, “plenary authority over the tribal

11. Id. at *4.
12. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128,
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4–6
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
13. Id. at *7.
14. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
15. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
16. Andrea M. Seielstad, The Recognition and Evolution of Tribal Sovereign Immunity Under
Federal Law: Legal, Historical, and Normative Reflections on a Fundamental Aspect of American
Indian Sovereignty, 37 TULSA L. REV. 661, 683–84 (2002).
17. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 566 (1903).
18. Id. at 565.
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relations of the Indians has been exercised by Congress from the
beginning . . . .”19
The foundational cases establishing a general concept of tribal sovereign
immunity were decided in the early 1800s, and taken together, they are referred
to as “The Marshall Trilogy.”20 The first of these cases, Johnson v. M’Intosh,
established that the tribes possessed lesser rights than the complete federal
sovereignty of the United States.21 Tribal sovereigns enjoyed sovereignty
rights accorded to “independent nations” insofar as they had the right to occupy
their lands and “use it according to their own discretion,” but the official title
to the land belonged to the government of the United States.22
The second case in the trilogy is Cherokee Nation v. Georgia.23 In
Cherokee Nation, the state of Georgia sought to seize the lands of the Cherokee
Nation and enforce certain laws against the Tribe.24 The Cherokees sued in the
Supreme Court, arguing that the Supreme Court had jurisdiction over
controversies arising between states and foreign states.25 The Court rejected
the Cherokee Nation’s argument that they were a foreign state.26 Rather, the
Court contended that there was a “peculiar” relationship between the United
States and the tribes that was unlike anything else in existence.27 The tribes
relied on the U.S. government for protection and trade, and they were granted
some representation in Congress when deemed appropriate.28 Because of this
unique relationship, the Cherokee Nation could not be considered a foreign
nation as it was meant by the Constitution.29 Rather, the tribes were more
appropriately designated “domestic dependent nations” because the United
States was essentially their guardian while the tribal nations were merely the
United States’ wards.30
The last case in the trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, came about after Georgia
again attempted to enforce its laws against a member of the Cherokee Nation.31
However, the Court found that the Cherokee Nation was “a distinct community
occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id.
Seielstad, supra note 16, at 686.
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 574 (1823).
Id.
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
Id. at 15.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 19–20.
Id. at 17.
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 537–38 (1832).
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laws of Georgia can have no force.”32 The regulation of the Cherokee Nation
was “committed exclusively to the government of the union.”33 Therefore, only
the federal government could exercise any power over a tribe, and the state in
which the tribe resided had no regulatory authority.
Based on this initial framework set forth by these earlier cases, the Court in
Turner v. United States, declared that “the Creek Nation was free from liability
for injuries to persons or property due to mob violence or failure to keep the
peace” after tribal members destroyed the fence of a neighboring property.34
No liability could exist against the Tribe without authorization from Congress
or consent from the Tribe because the Creek Nation was “a distinct political
community.”35 However, the Court at the time declined to adopt a full
sovereign immunity doctrine, stating that “[t]he fundamental obstacle to
recovery is not the immunity of a sovereign to suit, but the lack of a substantive
right to recover the damages resulting from failure of a government or its
officers to keep the peace.”36
Finally, the Supreme Court, resting on its holding in Turnery, talked
explicitly of the immunity of tribal nations for the first time in 1940.37 The
Court held that the tribes possessed an immunity from any direct suit or cross
suit absent Congressional authorization.38 The Court reaffirmed the tribal
sovereign immunity doctrine in 1977 stating that “[a]bsent an effective waiver
or consent, it is settled that a state court may not exercise jurisdiction over a
recognized Indian tribe.”39
Despite this seemingly settled doctrine, the Supreme Court has called into
question the continuation of this policy.40 The Court in Kiowa Tribe of
Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. expressed that perhaps Turner
was never intended to be the basis for a doctrine of tribal immunity, and the
doctrine only evolved because later courts kept citing to it with little analysis.41
The Court criticized the continuance of the doctrine, arguing that its relevance
in the modern world was questionable.42 Nevertheless, the Court upheld the

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 561.
Id.
Turner v. United States, 248 U.S. 354, 357–58 (1919).
Id. at 357–59.
Id. at 358.
United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512 (1940).
Id. at 512–13.
Puyallup Tribe, Inc. v. Dept. of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 172 (1977).
Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg. Tech., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 757 (1998).
Id.
Id. at 757–58.
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doctrine.43 The Court recognized Congress’ right to regulate tribal policy and
deferred to Congress to make any changes to the currently standing doctrine.44
However, acts of Congress since Kiowa have done little to disturb the tribal
immunity doctrine.45
This tribal sovereign immunity is different from what is enjoyed by the
states, which are granted their immunity under the Eleventh Amendment.46
While both tribal nations and states are generally immune from suit by private
parties, two key distinctions exist. First, individuals can sue tribes in a broader
range of circumstances because tribes can have their immunity abrogated by
Congress whereas states generally cannot.47 Indeed, there are only two
circumstances that allow an individual to sue a state:48 “Congress may
authorize such a suit in the exercise of its power to enforce the Fourteenth
Amendment [or] a State may waive its sovereign immunity by consenting to
suit.”49 Second, tribes are immune from suit by states, whereas states are not
immune from suit by sister states.50
What makes the States’ surrender of immunity from suit by sister States
plausible is the mutuality of that concession. There is no such mutuality with
either foreign sovereigns or Indian tribes . . . as it would be absurd to suggest
that the tribes surrendered immunity in a convention to which they were not
even parties.51
This difference between the two entities can perhaps explain the different
outcomes tribes and states have had at the PTAB when trying to use a sovereign
immunity argument.

43. Id. at 759.
44. Id. As suggested by one author, the Court at the time knew that Congress was in the process
of reconsidering the tribal sovereign immunity doctrine and may have ruled as it did thinking Congress
would remedy the situation on its own. Seielstad, supra note 16, at 665–66.
45. See e.g., Indian Tribal Economic Development and Contracts Encouragement Act of 2000,
Pub. L. No. 106-179, 114 Stat. 46 (2000). This legislation increased the clarity with which contracts
with tribes must be made to avoid issues with sovereign immunity upon a breach of the agreement.
See id.
46. “The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
47. See e.g., discussion infra Part III.
48. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670
(1999).
49. Id.
50. Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak and Circle Vill., 501 U.S. 775, 782 (1991).
51. Id. (explaining that the tribes never surrendered their immunity from suit because they were
not present at the Constitutional Convention).
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II. SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
As previously established, tribal sovereign immunity can only be abrogated
by Congress or through an express waiver by the tribe.52 There are quite a few
areas where Congress has used its authority to limit tribal immunity (e.g.,
murder, kidnapping, arson),53 but intellectual property is not one of them.
However, Congress did pass two acts attempting to abrogate state sovereign
immunity with respect to patents and trademarks: the Trademark Remedy
Clarification Act of 1992 (TRCA)54 and the Patent and Plant Variety Protection
Remedy Clarification Act (PRCA).55 Prior to the TRCA, individuals did not
have a private right of action against a state that misrepresented its product in
violation of section 43(a) of the Trademark Act of 1946.56 By enacting the
TRCA, Congress intended to extend the phrase “[a]ny person” in section 43(a)
to include state entities, thus abrogating the immunity of the states with regard
to trademark infringement.57 Similarly, the PRCA was enacted to abrogate state
immunity with regard to patent infringement.58 In two sister cases, the Supreme
Court addressed the validity of these acts after a claim that a Florida state entity
falsely represented its product in violation of section 4359 and infringed on
College Savings Bank’s patent.60 In both of these instances, the Court held that
Congress did not have the power to abrogate the state’s sovereign immunity.61
These cases seemed to suggest that where intellectual property rights had been
infringed, sovereign immunity would prevail.
Even more recently, in Covidien, the PTAB held that state entities were
protected from IPR due to their state sovereign immunity.62 Covidien filed
52. See discussion supra Part II.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 1153(a) (2012).
54. Trademark Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-542, 106 Stat. 3567 (1992).
55. Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, Pub. L. No. 102-560, 106
Stat. 4230 (1992).
56. “Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a), enacted in 1946, created a private
cause of action against ‘[a]ny person’ who uses false descriptions or makes false representations in
commerce.” Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 670
(1999).
57. Id.
58. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 630
(1999).
59. Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 671
(1999).
60. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. at 630.
61. Id. at 647; Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 691.
62. Covidien LP v. Univ. of Fla. Research Found., Nos. IPR2016-01274, IPR2016-01275,
IPR2016-01276, 2017 WL 4015009, at *1 (P.T.A.B. Jan. 25, 2017). It should, however, be noted that
future PTAB decisions are typically not bound by stare decisis in the same manner as the judiciary
branch of the government. PTAB’s Designations for Opinions, USPTO (Jan. 12, 2016),
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petitions requesting IPR on patents held by the University of Florida Research
Foundation (UFRF).63 The UFRF filed a motion to dismiss, alleging its
sovereign immunity was a defense to the IPR petition. The PTAB held that the
Eleventh Amendment “limit[ed] not only the judicial authority of the federal
courts to subject a state to an unconsented suit, but also preclude[d] certain
adjudicative administrative proceedings.”64 The holding in Covidien applied
not only to the state of Florida proper but also extended to any state agents or
instrumentalities, which included the University of Florida’s research
foundation.65
To come to this conclusion, the PTAB focused on the Supreme Court case,
Federal Maritime Communication v. South Carolina State Ports Authority
(FMC), which was a Supreme Court case that considered whether state
sovereign
immunity
precluded
the
FMC from “adjudicating a private party’s complaint that a state-run port ha[d]
violated the Shipping Act of 1984.”66 The Court held that the similarities
between agency adjudications bared such strong similarities to civil litigation
that the states could not be subjected to such proceedings due to their state
sovereignty.67 The PTAB held that proceedings before the PTO were much
like the adjudications considered in FMC, and therefore, the state had a
sovereign immunity defense against any IPR.68
It seems that Allergan was emboldened by the PTAB’s decision in Covidien
because less than a year after that decision came out, Allergan put out its press
release announcing the transfer of its patent to the Regis Mohawk Tribe.69 This
may have been a gamble that was not worth its initial $13.75 million price tag
(not to mention the additional $15 million per year in royalties)70 because the
PTAB rejected the Regis Mohawk Tribe’s argument that tribal sovereign
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/PTAB%20Designations%20for%20Opinions%2
01-12-2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/GFN4-S6MA]. This lack of consistency when issuing opinions is
another source of frustration between industry professionals and the PTAB—without stare decisis,
practitioners are left guessing about what the outcome will be at the PTAB. See e.g., Kate Gaudry &
Thomas Franklin, Only 1 in 20,631 ex parte appeals designated precedential by PTAB,
IPWATCHDOG (Sep. 27, 2015), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/09/27/only-1-in-20631-ex-parteappeals-designated-precedential-by-ptab/id=61999/ [https://perma.cc/57QE-NGMK]. The title refers
to ex parte appeals, but most PTAB decisions are designated as “routine” and therefore nonprecedential. PTAB’s Designations for Opinions, supra.
63. Covidien LP, WL 4015009 at *1.
64. Id. at *2.
65. Id. at *12.
66. Fed. Maritime Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 747 (2002).
67. Id. at 760.
68. Covidien LP, WL 4015009 at *8.
69. Press Release, Allergan, supra note 4.
70. Id.
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immunity applied to the inter partes review proceedings and declared that
Allergan was still the owner for purposes of the proceedings.71 In coming to
this decision, the PTAB recognized that a tribe was a “‘domestic dependent
nation[]’ that exercise[s] ‘inherent sovereign authority’” and that a tribe can
only be subjected to suit when explicitly authorized by Congress or when
immunity has been waived by the tribe.72 However, despite a lack of express
abrogation by Congress or waiver by the Regis Mohawk Tribe, the PTAB held
that tribal sovereign immunity did not apply in the same manner as state
sovereign immunity.73
While recognizing the doctrine of tribal immunity, the PTAB considered a
line of cases that indicated that Congress could impliedly abrogate immunity
when a statute was of general applicability. The Supreme Court held in Federal
Power Commission v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, that “a general statute in terms
applying to all persons includes Indians and their property interests.”74 The
Court further noted that acts of general applicability will apply to tribes unless
there is “a clear expression [of Congress] to the contrary.”75 This case looked
at whether licensees of the Federal Power Commission had the authority to
“take lands owned by Indians, as well as those of all other citizens, when needed
for a licensed project, upon the payment of just compensation.”76 While the
Supreme Court appeared to only hold with reference to actual property rights,
the PTAB took this ruling, applied it to intellectual property rights,77 and held
that the Patent Act was a general act with which the tribe was required to
comply.78

71. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128,
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018). The PTAB reiterated the doubt expressed in Kiowa to help justify its
decision to deny the tribal immunity. Id. at *4.
72. Id. at *3.
73. Id. at *4–6.
74. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 116 (1960).
75. Id. at 120.
76. Id. at 123.
77. Actual property rights and intellectual property rights are not exactly analogous bodies of
law. See e.g., Andrew Lee, Intellectual Property, Moral Rights, and Social Utility: A Classically
Liberal Exploration of the Normative and Practical Implications of Intellectual Property Rights, 7
N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 431, 432-33 (2013) (“The protection of intellectual property creates interesting
problems for scholars and lawmakers who, despite their devotion to the preservation of physical
property rights, nonetheless feel that intellectual property rights represent a set of concerns and
principles that can be quite distinct from those evoked by ownership of a plot of land or a bag of
gold.”).
78. Mylan Pharms. Inc. v. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe, Nos. IPR2016-01127, IPR2016-01128,
IPR2016-01129, IPR2016-01130, IPR2016-01131, IPR2016-01132, 2018 WL 1100950, at *4–6
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 23, 2018).
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A prominent case extending the holding of Federal Power Commission
beyond property rights is Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm.79 In this
case, an Occupational Safety and Health Administrator (OSHA) compliance
officer found twenty-one health and safety violations at the Coeur d’Alene
Tribal Farm, which was wholly owned and operated by the Coeur d’Alene
Indian Tribe.80 The Tribe did not argue the validity of the violations but instead
argued that they had tribal immunity from any liability under the Occupational
Safety and Health Act.81 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that Congress
limited the Tribe’s immunity when it created this Act because it was of general
applicability to all “employers.”82 The court noted three exceptions to this rule
that general acts should apply to tribes equally as to any other body:
(1) the law touches ‘exclusive rights of self-governance in purely
intramural matters’; (2) the application of the law to the tribe would
‘abrogate rights guaranteed by Indian treaties’; or (3) there is proof ‘by
legislative history or some other means that Congress intended [the
law] not to apply to Indians on their reservations.83
This reasoning has been applied with mixed results in different circuits.84
The PTAB’s decision that patent laws are generally applicable, and thus
abrogate the tribe’s sovereign immunity, is not entirely novel. However, this
argument has not been addressed in a patent law context by the Supreme Court,
and the lower courts that have heard such claims have typically found the
argument lacking. For example, in Microlog Corp. v. Continental Airlines,
Inc., the court held that “[t]he Patent Act, though authorizing civil actions for
infringement, does not unequivocally abrogate an Indian Tribe’s immunity
from suit for patent infringement.”85 The court in Specialty House of Creation,
Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe of Oklahoma took the analysis one step further and argued

79. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113 (9th Cir. 1985).
80. Id. at 1114.
81. Id. at 1115.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1116 (quoting United States v. Farris, 624 F.2d 890, 893–94 (9th Cir. 1980)).
84. See e.g., Donovan v. Navajo Forest Prods. Indus., 692 F.2d 709, 711–12 (10th Cir. 1982)
(holding that OSHA did not apply to the Navajo Tribe because it violated treaty rights to exclude nonIndians from tribal property, interfered with tribal sovereignty and self-government, and the general
applicability language was not strong enough to abrogate rights granted by treaties); EEOC v.
Cherokee Nation, 871 F.2d 937 (10th. Cir. 1989) (holding that the EEOC did not have authority over
the Cherokee Nation because the Tribe had a “treaty-protected right of self-government,” and the
statute did not expressly abrogate the treaty rights).
85. Microlog Corp. v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., No. 6:10-CV-260, 2011 WL 13141413, at *2 (E.D.
Tex. Jul. 22, 2011).
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that the fact that Congress did not include tribes as possible infringing parties
in the PRCA “[d]espite providing specifically for waiver of state sovereign
immunity” demonstrated that Congress had not unequivocally waived any
tribal sovereign immunity.86
The Regis Mohawk Tribe was also unsuccessful on appeal to the Federal
Circuit, although the Federal Circuit did not directly address the PTAB’s
“implied abrogation” argument.87 Rather, the court used a similar analysis to
the one used by the PTAB in Covidien, which looked at the Supreme Court’s
decision in FMC. However, the Federal Circuit came to the opposite
conclusion that the PTAB came to in Covidien. In FMC, the Supreme Court
held that immunity exists where adjudication proceedings are brought against
a state by a private party, and there is no immunity where proceedings are an
agency-initiated enforcement proceeding.88 In its review, the Federal Circuit
determined that the IPR system is a hybrid of these two proceedings, but there
were several factors that made the court decide that IPR “is more like an agency
enforcement action than a civil suit brought by a private party.”89 Namely, the
USPTO Director (rather than a private party) had broad discretion in instituting
reviews, the PTAB could continue its review even if the private party petitioner
decided not to participate, the USPTO proceedings did not mirror Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure, which would suggest a civil proceeding, and the USPTO’s
authority was often more inquisitorial than adjudicatory.90 The court concluded
that because the IPR system is more like an agency enforcement action than a
civil suit, sovereign immunity was not available as a defense to IPR.91
The Federal Circuit’s opinion is confusing for a few reasons. First, the
court ignored the fact that the PTAB had reached an opposite conclusion in
Covidien and made no attempt to clarify how the two cases were
distinguishable. Similarly, the court failed to address the PTAB’s implied
abrogation theory or any other prior case law that established guidelines for
when to give tribes immunity in federal proceedings. It is also unclear why the
court decided to use a case that discussed state immunity rather than one of the
86. Specialty House of Creation, Inc. v. Quapaw Tribe of Okla., No. 10-CV-371-GKF-TLW,
2011 WL 308903, at *1 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 27, 2011). The Second Circuit also conducted a similar
analysis when analyzing a copyright infringement case against the Mashantucket Pequot Tribe. Bassett
v. Mashantucket Pequot Tribe, 204 F.3d 343, 346 (2d Cir. 2000). The court held that the Tribe enjoyed
immunity from copyright infringement claims because the Copyright Act does not expressly abrogate
tribal immunity. Further stating, “the fact that a statute applies to Indian tribes does not mean that
Congress abrogated tribal immunity in adopting it.” Id. at 357.
87. Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharms., Inc., 896 F.3d 1322, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2018).
88. Id. at 1327.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1328–29.
91. Id. at 1327.
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many existing approaches for tribal immunity.92 With its opinion, the court
added another layer of confusion to the tribal sovereignty doctrine.
III. UNITED STATES ANTITRUST LAW AS AN ALTERNATIVE MEANS OF
DETERRENCE
Eliminating or limiting tribal immunity does not seem to be the correct
approach for handling a case such as this. As previously noted, tribal sovereign
immunity developed to atone for depriving tribes of their rights for years.
Cutting these rights down as a snap reaction to what is admittedly an
unscrupulous arrangement between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe
punishes all tribes for the actions of one. A more appropriate way to invalidate
this arrangement would be to invalidate it under antitrust laws, thus leaving
tribal rights intact.
A patent-owner essentially has a government-sanctioned monopoly over its
product for the life of the patent.93 The importance of stimulating discovery
and invention was recognized by the Constitution, which granted Congress the
power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries.”94 This is exemplified under section 154 of the
Patent Act, which states that a patent-holder has “the right to exclude others
from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the
United States or importing the invention into the United States” for a period of
twenty years from the date of filing the application.95 As part of the system that
grants these monopolies, the government has set up certain systems to regulate,
including the IPR system through the PTAB.
Despite the fact that the granting of a patent establishes what is essentially
a monopoly, patent-holders still must strike a balance between their patentmonopoly and any applicable antitrust laws.96 Under the Noerr-Pennington
doctrine, a private party is typically immune from antitrust liability when the
party is seeking to influence government action, even where that action would
hinder competition.97 This doctrine attempts to strike a balance between

92. Even more confounding, the court indicated that even though it used a case on state
sovereign immunity to decide this case on tribal sovereign immunity, this holding would not
necessarily apply to a state challenge under the same circumstances. Id. at 1329.
93. See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2231 (2013).
94. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
95. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (2012).
96. GLEN P. BELVIS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS: PROTECTING
THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE § 6.07 (Law Journal Press 2018).
97. Enforcement Perspectives on the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, FTC STAFF REPORT 1
(2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/ftc-staff-report-concerning-
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encouraging competition while not impinging on a party’s freedom of speech.98
When a party seeks to enforce its intellectual property rights in court, it is
seeking redress from the government and would fall under the NoerrPennington doctrine.
Thus, typically under this doctrine, Allergan’s
infringement suit against Teva would be immune from antitrust allegations.
However, there are several exceptions to the Noerr-Pennington doctrine.
Most notably in this case, the immunity provided by the doctrine is lost when a
party uses sham litigation to enforce intellectual property rights in court.99 A
sham litigation occurs when the lawsuit is objectively baseless and when the
litigant’s subjective motivation is to interfere with the business of a competitor
through the use of the governmental process.100 A lawsuit is objectively
baseless when “no reasonable litigant could realistically expect to succeed on
the merits of the suit.”101 A litigant’s subjective motivation is suspect when the
“baseless lawsuit was an attempt to use the litigation process—as opposed to
the outcome of the litigation—as an anticompetitive weapon.”102
The subjective motivation in this case helps to illuminate whether the
lawsuit was objectively baseless. While subjective motivation may be hard to
prove, Allergan has made its motivation abundantly clear: it feared a losing
case and arranged a deal with the Regis Mohawk Tribe as means to outsmart
the system. Presumably, Allergan would not have made any arrangement with
the Regis Mohawk Tribe if it believed that it was going to win on the merits of
its infringement case, thus suggesting an objectively baseless lawsuit. Allergan
weaponized the Regis Mohawk Tribe’s immunity to give itself an
anticompetitive edge. Because the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunity would
likely fail, Allergan should have to answer to the antitrust implications of its
actions in addition to the IPR.
If the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunity is lost, then the Sherman Act
may apply. Section 1 of the Sherman Act states, “Every contract . . . or
conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States . . . is
hereby declared to be illegal.”103 Section 2 of the Sherman Act states, “Every
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire

enforcement-perspectives-noerr-pennington-doctrine/p013518enfperspectnoerrpenningtondoctrine.pdf [https://perma.cc/T22R-X68P].
98. Id.
99. See E. R.R. Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 144 (1961).
100. Mark L. Kovner et al., Applying the Noerr Doctrine to Pharmaceutical Patent Litigation,
71 ANTITRUST L.J. 609, 619 (2003).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
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with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States . . . shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”104
There are two types of analysis that courts use to assess if a party has
operated in violation of the Sherman Act. The evaluating body will either use
a per se analysis or a rule of reason analysis.105 A per se analysis is used where
a restraint on trade is “so plainly anticompetitive” that there is no need for “an
elaborate inquiry into the restraint’s likely competitive effect.”106 This is
generally reserved for situations such as “naked price-fixing, output restraints,
and market division among horizontal competitors, as well as certain group
boycotts.”107 Most challenges in intellectual property will require a rule of
reason analysis.108 This requires an assessment of “whether the restraint is
likely to have anticompetitive effect and, if so, whether the restraint is
reasonably necessary to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those
anticompetitive effects.”109
However, patents present a unique challenge to an antitrust analysis
because “[b]y their nature, patents create an environment of exclusion, and
consequently, cripple competition.”110 This analysis issue has arisen in another
type of pharmaceutical arrangement that has drawn criticism as a violation of
the Sherman Act: “reverse payment” settlements aka “pay-to-delay”
schemes.111 The issues with this type of arrangement was well-described by
the Supreme Court in FTC v. Actatvis, Inc.112 The Court explained:
Company A sues Company B for patent infringement. The two
companies settle under terms that require (1) Company B, the claimed
infringer, not to produce the patented product until the patent’s term
expires, and (2) Company A, the patentee, to pay B many millions of
104. 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
105. Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, U.S. DOJ AND FTC 16–17
(Jan.
12,
2017)
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1049793/ip_guidelines_2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/U8Z4-RB8R].
106. Id. at 17.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 16.
109. Id. at 17.
110. Schering-Plough Corp. v. FTC, 402 F.3d 1056, 1065–66 (11th Cir. 2005).
111. See e.g., FTC v. Watson Pharms., Inc., 677 F.3d 1298, 1301 (11th Cir. 2012) (explaining
that in “pay for delay” or “reverse payment” arrangements, “a patent holder pays the allegedly
infringing generic drug company to delay entering the market until a specified date, thereby protecting
the patent monopoly against a judgment that the patent is invalid or would not be infringed by the
generic competitor”).
112. FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223 (2013) (minority held that “[a] patent carves out an
exception to the applicability of antitrust laws.”)
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dollars. Because the settlement requires the patentee to pay the alleged
infringer, rather than the other way around, this kind of settlement is
often called a “reverse payment” settlement agreement.113
In FTC, the Court noted that this arrangement occurs mostly “in the context
of pharmaceutical drug regulation, and specifically in the context of suits
brought under statutory provisions allowing a generic drug manufacturer . . . to
challenge the validity of a patent owned by an already-approved brand-name
drug owner.”114
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals, which heard FTC v. Actavis prior
to the Supreme Court, held that “absent sham litigation or fraud in obtaining
the patent, a reverse payment settlement is immune from antitrust attack so long
as its anticompetitive effects fall within the scope of the exclusionary potential
of the patent.”115 This holding essentially protected reverse payments from
antitrust challenges. However, on appeal, the Supreme Court rejected that idea
because the Sherman Act “imposes strict limitations on the concerted activities
in which patent owners may lawfully emerge,”116 and these arrangements have
the “potential for genuine adverse effects on competition.”117
The Court concluded that the rule of reason analysis that applies to any
other type of antitrust litigation must also apply when assessing an arrangement
where one party is a patent-holder.118 It also noted that the Hatch-Waxman Act
itself, which was clearly procompetitive, ran contrary to the Court of Appeals’
conclusion that reverse payment schemes should be immune from antitrust
attack.119 The Court remanded for further proceedings but suggested some
areas where the lower court might find anticompetitive effects as part of its
analysis.120 The Court noted that only valid patents had a right to exclude others
from use; “an invalidated patent carries with it no such right.”121 However, if
the reverse payment scheme is allowed to stand without further analysis, it is
possible that the patent-monopoly will be allowed to continue, at the expense
of the consumer, even though the patent may in fact be invalid.122 Also, the

113. Id. at 2227.
114. Id.
115. FTC v. Watson, 677 F.3d at 1312.
116. FTC v. Actavis, 133 S. Ct. at 2232 (quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S.
174, 197 (1963)).
117. Id. at 2234 (quoting FTC v. Indiana Fed’n of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 460–61 (1986)).
118. Id. at 2236.
119. Id. at 2234.
120. Id. at 2234–38.
121. Id. at 2231 (emphasis in original).
122. Id. at 2234.
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Court questioned whether a large reverse payment might demonstrate that the
patentee was charging prices that were “higher than the competitive level,”
referring to the FTC’s claim that “reverse payment agreements are associated
with the presence of higher-than-competitive profits.”123
The Court
acknowledged that the patentee may be able to justify the large reverse
payment, making it a permissible settlement agreement, but there was no
immunity preempting the parties from having to demonstrate this kind of
analysis.124
While looking at settlement arrangements between brand-named patentholders and generic-brand would-be competitors is not an exact equivalent to
the arrangement between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe, the Court’s
logic still seems very applicable. Despite the fact that Allergan had a patent
that it would normally be free to assign or use in any other manner it found
suitable, the patent should not provide complete immunity because the Sherman
Act “imposes strict limitations on the concerted activities in which patent
owners may lawfully engage.”125 Thus, it must be determined if the
arrangement between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe, “is likely to have
anticompetitive effect and, if so, whether the restraint is reasonably necessary
to achieve procompetitive benefits that outweigh those anticompetitive effects”
using a rule of reason analysis.126
The anticompetitive effects seem obvious and significant. Allergan has not
tried to cover up the fact that the sole reason for the arrangement with the Regis
Mohawk Tribe was to avoid having its patent invalidated, which would permit
generic drug manufacturers to enter the market. These actions were intended
to prolong the patent-monopoly beyond what might have been otherwise
allowable—this is the epitome of an anticompetitive arrangement.
Also, as suggested by the Court in FTC, an invalid patent has no right to
any patent protection. By circumventing the system that seeks to determine the
validity of the patent, a patent-monopoly may be extended to a product that is
not actually deserving of such protection. The possibility that an invalid patent
for the brand-name drug is allowed to stand and continue to exclude generics
from entering the market is plainly anticompetitive.
Finally, the Court in FTC questioned whether the presence of a large
reverse payment demonstrated that the patentee was charging prices that were
“higher-than-competitive.” A similar question could be asked of Allergan’s
drug pricing given that it was willing and able to pay the Regis Mohawk Tribe
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 2236.
Id. at 2237.
Id. at 2232 (quoting United States v. Singer Mfg. Co., 374 U.S. 174, 197 (1963)).
See Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property, supra note 105, at 17.
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a substantial sum of money to take over its patent. If no legitimate explanation
can be offered by Allergan, it is possible that this “sale” might be demonstrative
of a severe anticompetitive effect.
The procompetitive benefits are less obvious, but they do exist. Typically,
licensing agreements are favored because they tend to allow more people access
to the patent.127 Furthermore, the Native American population is a group that
has historically faced discrimination and disenfranchisement.128 The Regis
Mohawk Tribe has retained rights in this agreement to “practice the patents for
research, education, and other non-commercial uses.”129 Theoretically, if the
Regis Mohawk Tribe took advantage of these rights, the Regis Mohawk Tribe
could have an opportunity to gain valuable experience and become a
competitive player in the market. These potential benefits could be a serious
benefit to the Regis Mohawk Tribe, but there is nothing that indicates the Regis
Mohawk Tribe has any intention to take advantage of them.
The anticompetitive effects are clearly unreasonable, even considering any
possible procompetitive benefits. They run counter to the purpose of two large
acts of Congress that attempted to curb such effects. The Hatch-Waxman Act
was clearly intended to allow generics to enter the market sooner, and the inter
partes review proceedings function to invalidate patents in an expedient
manner. The arrangement between Allergan and the Regis Mohawk Tribe was
an attempt to dodge these restraints that Congress enacted upon the patentmonopoly.
Despite the analysis weighing towards a violation of the Sherman Act, there
is of course still a question of whether the Regis Mohawk Tribe would attempt
to shield itself behind its tribal sovereign immunity. Given the perceived
egregiousness of this arrangement, it seems very possible that (if this were to
reach the Supreme Court), the Court would use this occasion to act on the
doubts it expressed in Kiowa about the continued benefit of tribal immunity in
a modern world. Even if the Regis Mohawk Tribe were found to be protected,
Allergan would have no such protection and could still be held responsible for
its actions. The punishment of the one party would still be enough to deter any
similar arrangements in the future.

127. Id. at 5–7.
128. See e.g., Jeremiah A. Bryar, What Goes Around, Comes Around: How Indian Tribes Can
Profit in the Aftermath of Seminole Tribe and Florida Prepaid, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 229,
230 (2009). This article suggests that the creation of “sovereign chartered research groups [would]
drive additional funding into the tribes, create jobs for tribal members, and bring hope into the lives of
a people who desperately need it.” Id. at 248.
129. Allergan, Inc. v. Teva Pharms. USA, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-1455-WCB, 2017 WL 4619790, at
*15 (E.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2017).
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CONCLUSION
Congress could address these issues to prevent any such instances in the
future. The case law is clear: Congress can abrogate the tribal immunity with
respect to patent (and other intellectual property law)—it just has to do so in a
manner that is unequivocal. Perhaps taking such actions would prevent similar
unscrupulous business decisions in the future. If Congress has purposefully not
abrogated tribal immunity with respect to intellectual property law for whatever
reason,130 it could also stipulate that tribal immunity applies where the tribe was
the inventor or rightfully obtained rights to a patent (i.e., through purchasing
the rights; not for being paid to hold onto the rights). But “sovereign immunity
should not be treated as a monetizable commodity that can be purchased by
private entities as part of a scheme to evade their legal responsibilities.”131 In
the absence of such Congressional action, this arrangement should be
recognized for what it is: an attempt to bypass current patent laws at the expense
of the public that depends on critical drugs and a violation of U.S. antitrust law.

130. And there are legitimate reasons. American tribal relations are notably tainted by a sordid
past, and there are situations where sovereign immunity is an important right. However, one could
hardly argue that the intention behind creating a tribal immunity policy was to grant tribes the right to
collude with powerful industry players to circumvent antitrust laws.
131. Allergan, Inc., 2017 WL 4619790 at *12.

